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INTRODUCTION 
Today software license agreements are universal.1  Almost 
every functioning modern company licenses software, either as 
vendor or user, to help run the business.  Even after the technology 
industry downturn, many technology companies base their 
business model on licensing out their technology.2  These licenses 
are typically sophisticated contracts with ongoing obligations for 
both parties: service, support, and upgrade responsibilities on the 
part of the licensor, and confidentiality requirements and copyright 
and use restrictions on the part of the licensee.3 
In addition to basic contract law that applies to the actual 
software license, software vendors also rely on trade secrets 
doctrine and copyright law to protect their products.4  However, 
despite updates in intellectual property law to accommodate the 
challenges software presents,5 licenses are still the predominant 
method for transferring software rights from one party to another.6  
One reason for the prevalence of software licenses in the industry 
is that it permits software companies the control they need in a 
rapidly changing technical environment, without waiting for the 
law to catch up.7  For example, licensing permits the vendor to 
restrict the licensee’s right to use software in ways not allowed in 
 
 1 See Viktoria L. Gres, Rejection of Computer Software Licensing Agreements in 
Bankruptcy, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 366 (1987). 
 2 See Geoff Nairn, FT REPORT—DIGITAL BUSINESS: Innovation Highlights Flaws 
in Licence Model, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Mar. 8, 2006; CDC Corporation 
Announces Preliminary Financial Results and Certain Operating Metrics for Q4 2005 
and Full Year 2005, PR NEWSWIRE US, Mar. 3, 2006, available at 
http://www.cdccorporation.net/newsroom/news/000493.shtml. 
 3 See Adobe Systems, Inc. v. One Stop Micros, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091–91 n.2 
(N.D. Cal. 2000). 
 4 See, e.g., Duncan M. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive 
Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 337, 340 (1983). 
 5 For example, the enactment of the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 
provided that software could be copyrighted. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000).  In addition, the 
Patent and Trademark Office refused software patent applications until 1981, when the 
Supreme Court held that an otherwise patentable invention does not become unpatentable 
because it uses an algorithm or a computer program. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
187 (1981). 
 6 Adobe, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 1091. 
 7 Id. at 1092 (Amy Grant’s expert testimony). 
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sales relying only on the provisions of the Copyright Act.8  When 
using a license, the vendor can “make multiple ‘sales’ to the same 
‘buyer’ of a copyrighted product that normally could only be sold 
once to a buyer.”9  The vendor can also prevent the licensee of a 
copy of a computer program from disposing of the copy under the 
first sale doctrine of the Copyright Act.10  In addition, the license 
agreement allows the licensee to obtain maintenance, performance 
guarantees and other service arrangements from the licensor that 
enhance the value of the software.11 
In order to give both parties in a software license agreement the 
control they desire over their future rights and obligations, the 
license must be drafted to anticipate the bankruptcy of either 
party.12  The policy of the federal intellectual property laws to 
stimulate innovation13 may clash with the goals of the bankruptcy 
 
 8 Copyright protects only the expression of a work of authorship, but does not protect 
the ideas embodied within the work. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).  Copyright also does not 
protect decompilation and reengineering of software, which has been found to be a fair 
use. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 9 2-8 MATTHEW BENDER, COMPUTER CONTRACTS § 8.01 (2006); see 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(3) (2000). 
 10 BENDER, supra note 9, § 8.05. 
 11 Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134, 
140–41 & n.12 (1999) (noting impracticality of implementing licenses without 
“continuing assistance and maintenance from the software developer”); see Raymond T. 
Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of  the Uniform Commercial Code: A 
Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 281, 293 (1993) (stating “value conveyed 
in a software transaction is often independent of the tangible item involved”).  But see 
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of 
Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1560–66 (2005) (arguing that courts have 
failed to police the licensing system, leaving consumers with substandard software 
licensed without necessary support). 
 12 See, e.g., Gres, supra note 1, at 371–72; see generally David R. Kuney, Intellectual 
Property Law in Bankruptcy Court: The Search for a More Coherent Standard in 
Dealing with a Debtor’s Right to Assume and Assign Technology Licenses, 9 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 593 (2001) (discussing the tension between conflicting approaches 
to assignability in intellectual property and bankruptcy law and implications for 
licensees). 
 13 Everex Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 
1996) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 
(1989) (stating the patent system “encourage[s] the creation and disclosure of new, 
useful, and non-obvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive 
right to practice the invention for a period of years”)); David I. Cisar et al., Exclusive and 
Non-exclusive IP Licenses and Executory Contract Assumption and Assignment: Does 
Exclusivity Matter?, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28 (Feb. 2003). 
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code (giving the debtor a meaningful chance to reorganize and 
make a fresh start and providing the maximum return to 
creditors).14  Thus, license provisions written without a thorough 
understanding of the bankruptcy environment can lead to 
surprising and sometimes devastating results for both the licensor 
and the licensee.15 
This Article examines a number of issues that occur when one 
of the parties to a software license agreement files for bankruptcy.  
First, this Article will discuss the status of software license 
agreements in bankruptcy.  Second, this Article will examine the 
bankruptcy issues that affect licensees, both when the licensor is 
the debtor and when the licensee itself is the debtor.  Third, this 
Article will examine the bankruptcy issues that affect licensors.  
Finally, this Article will provide practical guidelines to use when 
drafting a license agreement in order to minimize the potential 
problems related to one party’s bankruptcy.  Although there are 
many kinds of software license agreements,16 all of which should 
be drafted with bankruptcy in mind, this Article will focus on 
software license agreements that are individually negotiated and 
drafted, typically between two companies, one of which is a 
vendor and the other a user of the software. 
I. SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY 
A. General Overview of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy 
When a debtor files for bankruptcy, one of the first steps is to 
find all of the debtor’s assets and gather them into the bankruptcy 
estate for eventual disbursement to creditors.17  In the case of 
outstanding contracts, whether they become part of the bankruptcy 
 
 14 Richard Lieb, The Interrelationship of Trademark Law and Bankruptcy Law, 64 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1990). 
 15 See generally J. Dianne Brinson, Software Distribution Agreements and Bankruptcy: 
The Licensor’s Perspective, 64 WASH. L. REV. 499 (1989) (discussing the effects of 
licensee bankruptcy on licensors and possible contractual prophylactics). 
 16 Common examples of license agreements are mass-market end-user license 
agreements (“EULAs”), distribution, and resale agreements. Gres, supra note 1, at 366–
74. 
 17 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 92 (3d ed. 2001). 
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estate depends on several factors.18  First, it must be determined if 
the contract is an asset or a liability to the debtor.19  This 
determination is fairly obvious if one of the parties has fully 
performed and one party has at least some portion of its obligations 
outstanding.20  The beneficial contract will be swept into the 
bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the debtor and the creditors.21  
On the other hand, the debtor will breach a detrimental contract, 
giving the other party a claim against the bankruptcy estate.22 
If, however, both parties to the contract have enough 
outstanding obligations to classify the contract as executory, the 
contract can be both an asset and a liability to the debtor.23  In this 
situation, the bankruptcy code authorizes a debtor in possession or 
bankruptcy trustee to assume, assign or reject the contract.24  This 
essentially allows the debtor to sweep any favorable contract into 
the bankruptcy estate (assumption),25 sell the debtor’s interest in 
the contract to a third party (assignment)26 or breach an 
unfavorable contract giving the other party a claim on the 
bankruptcy estate (rejection).27  Of course, this is a simplification 
of the process and the choices of the debtor will depend on the 
exact provisions contained within the contract.  The goal of this 
Article is to allow the parties to a software license agreement to 
anticipate the bankruptcy definition of their contract giving them 
the ability to control, ex ante, the choices a debtor will have in 
bankruptcy regarding their agreement. 
Because of the choice it allows to debtors, it is important to 
determine whether the software license is considered an executory 
contract under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Whether a contract 
is executory depends on the obligations of the parties set forth in 
the agreement and the degree to which the parties have performed 
 
 18 See id. at 109–29. 
 19 Id. at 109–12. 
 20 See id. at 109. 
 21 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000). 
 22 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 111. 
 23 Id. at 109. 
 24 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000). 
 25 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 120–26. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 112–20. 
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their duties as of the bankruptcy petition.28  Courts focus on the 
economic realities of the transaction as opposed to the labels used 
in the agreement (such as “license” or “royalty payment”).29 
The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define “executory 
contracts.”30  The most widely accepted definition is based on a 
formulation put forth by Professor Vern Countryman in the early 
1970s defining executory contracts as those in which “the 
obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract 
are so far unperformed that failure of either to complete 
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the 
performance of the other.”31  Determining what acts or omissions 
constitute a material breach requires an analysis of applicable non-
bankruptcy law.32  The classification of executory contracts will be 
discussed in more detail specifically regarding software license 
agreements later in this Article in Parts I.D and E. 
B. Assumption and Assignment of Executory Contracts 
Once it is determined that a contract is indeed executory, § 365 
authorizes the debtor in possession or trustee (“DIP/trustee”) to 
assume, assume and assign, or reject that contract.33  The 
DIP/trustee must cure certain defaults before assuming the 
executory contract and must provide adequate assurance of future 
performance of executory contracts that are in default.34  All 
assumptions are subject to the court’s approval, but most 
bankruptcy courts apply a relatively liberal “business judgment” 
 
 28 See Enter. Energy Corp. v. United States ex rel. IRS (In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc.), 
50 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 1995).  See generally Stuart M. Riback, Intellectual Property 
Licenses: The Impact of Bankruptcy, in UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LICENSE 2004, at 215 (PLI 2004). 
 29 See Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc. (In re DAK Indus., Inc.), 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 
n.2 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 30 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 109; BRINSON, supra note 15, at 511. 
 31 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Law: Part I, 57 MINN. L. 
REV. 439, 460 (1973).  See also In re Access Beyond Techs. Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 43 
(Bankr. D. Del. 1999), citing Enter. Energy, 50 F.3d at 244 n.20. 
 32 Enter. Energy, 50 F.3d at 238. 
 33 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000). 
 34 11 U.S.C. § 365(b). 
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standard in assessing any disputes over assumptions.35  Upon the 
court’s approval of the assumption of an executory contract, the 
entire contract is reinstated and becomes fully binding.36  This 
right to assume may not be waived by a contract provision or other 
pre-petition agreement, but it may be affected by non-bankruptcy 
law, as discussed later in Part III.37 
Once a debtor assumes an executory contract, it may seek to 
assign that contract to a third party.  Bankruptcy law generally 
authorizes the assignment of executory contracts even though the 
contract itself (or applicable non-bankruptcy law) may prohibit 
assignment.38  This is to afford the bankrupt estate the greatest 
flexibility in reorganizing its business and obtaining value for its 
creditors, even where the agreement expressly prohibits 
assignment.39  The Code, however, provides several exceptions 
and limitations on the assignment of contracts.40  Of greatest 
significance to software license agreements, the Bankruptcy Code 
prohibits the assignment of an executory contract where 
“applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such 
contract . . . from accepting performance from or rendering 
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in 
possession, whether or not such contract . . . prohibits or restricts 
assignment of rights or delegation of duties”41 and “such party 
does not consent to such assumption or assignment.”42  This 
exception encompasses non-exclusive copyright and patent 
licenses, which are non-assignable.43  The rationale behind this 
 
 35 See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985) (describing business judgment 
standard as deferring to debtor’s decision to assume or reject unless such decision was “in 
bad faith or in gross abuse of bankrupt’s retained business discretion”). 
 36 See Tenet Healthcare Phila., Inc. v. Nat’l Union of Hosp. Employees (In re 
Allegheny Health, Educ. and Res. Found.), 383 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an 
executory contract must be assumed in its entirety). 
 37 See In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 261 B.R. 103, 113 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001). 
 38 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (2000). 
 39 See, e.g., FutureSource LLC v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 2002); In re 
Wash. Capital Aviation & Leasing, 156 B.R. 167, 175 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993). 
 40 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2000) as referenced in § 365(f)(1). 
 41 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A). 
 42 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(B). 
 43 In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, 269 B.R. 300, 309 (Bankr. Del. 2001) (“Under 
copyright law, ‘a nonexclusive licensee has only a personal and not a property interest in 
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policy is that licenses are similar to personal services contracts.44  
The licensor has evaluated and relied on the promised performance 
of the named licensee when negotiating the terms of the license, 
and any substitution of licensee means a change in the substance of 
the terms of the agreement.45  Because of the way § 365 is drafted, 
once a contract falls under this assignment exception, a question 
arises as to whether the contract can even be assumed by a debtor 
in possession.46  Numerous courts have determined that § 365(c)(1) 
not only prevents the assignment of executory contracts, but also 
prevents the assumption and performance of the contract by the 
debtor itself.47  The ramifications of these decisions on software 
license agreements will be discussed later in this Article in Part III. 
C. Rejection of Executory Contracts 
Just as a DIP/trustee can assume a favorable executory 
contract, a DIP/trustee may reject any executory contract, subject 
to the bankruptcy court’s approval.48  Congress added this section 
to “allow a debtor to maximize its assets by minimizing its 
 
the [intellectual property],’ which ‘cannot be assigned unless the intellectual property 
owner authorizes the assignment. . . .’” (quoting In re Patient Educ. Media, 201 B.R. 234, 
242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997))); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult 
Entm’t. Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999) (“our precedents make it clear that 
federal patent law constitutes ‘applicable law’ within the meaning of § 365(c), and that 
nonexclusive patent licenses are ‘personal and assignable only with the consent of the 
licensor.’ (quoting Everex Sys. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673, 680 
(9th Cir. 1996))). 
 44 See In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, 269 B.R. at 311. 
 45 See generally 2-8 MATTHEW BENDER, COMPUTER CONTRACTS § 8.02 (2006) 
(discussing the application of copyright law to software licenses). 
 46 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 125–26; compare Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech 
Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997), with Catapult Entm’t Inc., 165 F.3d 747.  See also 
discussion in Part III. 
 47 See RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 271 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (“Without RCI’s consent, Sunterra was precluded from assuming the 
Agreement”); Catapult Entm’t. Inc., 165 F.3d at 754–55 (“We hold that, where 
applicable nonbankruptcy law makes an executory contract nonassignable because the 
identity of the nondebtor party is material, a debtor in possession may not assume the 
contract absent consent of the nondebtor party.”); In re W. Elecs. Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83 
(3d Cir. 1988) (“11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) creates a hypothetical test—i.e., under the 
applicable law, could the government refuse performance from ‘an entity other than the 
debtor or the debtor in possession.’”). 
 48 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000). 
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burdensome liabilities.”49  Rejection allows the debtor to notify the 
other contracting party and the bankruptcy court that it will not 
continue to perform its contractual obligations, similar in effect to 
an anticipatory breach of contract.50  Bankruptcy courts also apply 
the deferential business judgment rule in reviewing rejections of 
executory contracts.51  If the court approves a rejection of an 
executory contract, the Bankruptcy Code provides that the debtor 
is deemed to have breached the agreement, giving rise to a pre-
petition claim for damages for breach of contract.52  Essentially, 
unless the non-debtor has secured collateral for itself, the non-
debtor is left with a general unsecured claim against the debtor’s 
estate for contract damages.53  The Bankruptcy Code bars the 
remedy of specific performance for a rejected executory contract 
licensing intellectual property.54  Rejections of intellectual property 
licenses when the licensor is the debtor are also complicated by a 
special provision giving the non-debtor licensee additional choices 
unavailable to non-debtors in other executory contracts.55  The 
consequences of rejection of a software license agreement will be 
discussed in more detail Article in Part II. 
D. The Classification of Software License Agreements in 
Bankruptcy 
In order to decide whether a software license agreement is an 
executory contract, it is necessary to describe the license’s rights 
and obligations.56  There are two broad categories of license 
agreements for the purposes of this discussion: non-exclusive 
licenses, which grant the licensee the right to make use of the 
software without restricting the rights of the licensor to grant the 
 
 49 Walter D. Denson, The Source Code Escrow: A Worthwhile or Worthless Investment, 
1 RUTGERS BANKR. L.J. 1, 10 (2003). 
 50 See Daniel T. Brooks, Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, 272 
PLI/Pat 575, 607 (1988); Denson, supra note 49. 
 51 See Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 
318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943). 
 52 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2000). 
 53 Brooks, supra note 50. 
 54 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (2000). 
 55 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2000). 
 56 See Robert L. Tamietti, Technology Licenses Under the Bankruptcy Code: A 
Licensee’s Mine Field, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 295, 303 (1988). 
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same rights to other licensees; and exclusive licenses, which grant 
a licensee the right to be the only party to use the software.57 
In general, a nonexclusive software license is more like a rental 
agreement than a sale.58  It is a contract in which the licensor 
agrees to let the licensee use the licensor’s software application for 
a specified period of time and in certain stated ways.59  The 
licensee is essentially paying rent to the licensor for use of the 
licensor’s intangible property.  The licensor, however, does not 
transfer ownership of the software, but retains the rights and 
remedies associated with the intellectual property.60  Therefore, the 
license is not considered an assignment of intellectual property.61  
Instead, a non-exclusive license is merely a contractual promise 
not to sue the licensee.62  As mentioned in Part I.B above, courts 
consider most non-exclusive intellectual property licenses to be 
non-assignable by the licensee without the consent of the 
licensor.63 
Exclusive licenses, on the other hand, are more like an 
assignment or sale than the rental agreement of a nonexclusive 
license.64  Similar to an assignment, an exclusive software license 
is a transfer of copyright ownership.65  Importantly, unlike a non-
exclusive license, exclusive licenses are generally assignable by 
the licensee, unless the license agreement expressly provides 
otherwise or the licensor specifically consents to the assignment.66  
The rationale behind this rule is that the terms of a sale do not 
normally turn on the identity of the buyer.  Since the seller is not 
affected by the agreement after the sale is complete, there is no 
reliance on the personal services of the buyer/licensor when 
 
 57 Kuney, supra note 12, at 597. 
 58 See id. at 597–98. 
 59 See, e.g., BRINSON, supra note 15, at 509–10. 
 60 See Kuney, supra note 12, at 598. 
 61 See Richard L. Grier et al., Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act: 
Bringing Commercial Law into the 21st Century, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 69 (2001). 
 62 In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 63 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(B) (2000); see supra Part I.B. 
 64 Kuney, supra note 12, at 598. 
 65 Id. 
 66 H. Ward Classen, Fundamentals of Software Licensing, 37 IDEA 1, 10 (1996); see 
also In re Sentry Data, Inc., 87 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). 
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negotiating the terms of the agreement.  However, not all exclusive 
licenses resemble sales of intellectual property.67  For example, an 
exclusive license to market the software, often referred to as a 
software distribution agreement, is arguably a nonassignable 
license because it is more like a service agreement than a transfer 
of actual property.68 
The next step in classifying software license agreements is to 
decide whether they are executory contracts within the Bankruptcy 
Code.69  As with any other contract, this requires an analysis of the 
continuing obligations of both parties, using the Countryman 
definition described in Part I.A.70  Since many patent and copyright 
licenses contain standard provisions, some courts have simply 
presumed that intellectual property license agreements are 
executory without analyzing the nature of the ongoing obligations 
on both sides of the agreement.71  Despite broad similarities to 
patent and copyright licenses, since most software license 
agreements, especially those that are individually negotiated, have 
unique provisions and differ in the actual rights and obligations of 
each party, a better analysis would look at each software license 
agreement separately and make a decision depending on the 
existing obligations of each party.72  The rest of this section will 
look at common obligations contained in a typical software license 
agreement in an attempt to allow a drafter to predict whether a 
contract will be classified as executory based on the continuing 
obligations imposed by the agreement. 
 
 67 See, e.g., BRINSON, supra note 15, at 510. 
 68 Classen, supra note 66; see also In re Sentry Data, Inc., 87 B.R. 943, 947 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1988). 
 69 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 109. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See, e.g., 75 RCC Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp., 287 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr. D. Md. 
2003) (noting without analysis that “there is a long line of authority holding that 
intellectual property licensing agreements such as the SLA [Software License 
Agreement] are executory contracts.”), rev’d for other reasons, 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 
2004); In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 B.R. 300, 308–09 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2001); In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 72 See In re Learning Publ’ns, Inc., 94 B.R. 763, 765 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re 
Stein , Inc., 81 B.R. 263, 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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E. Common Obligations of a Software License Agreement and Its 
Resulting Classification as an Executory Contract 
Although sometimes presumptively classified as non-
executory, even exclusive licenses, which represent a more 
complete conveyance of rights than non-exclusive licenses, 
sometimes include significant ongoing contractual obligations and 
therefore can be classified as executory contracts.73  In Rudaw, for 
example, an exclusive transfer of copyright ownership was 
considered executory when the debtor filed for bankruptcy before 
the buyer completed all the installment payments for the 
software.74 
However, when the licensor bears little or no continuing 
obligations and the agreement has further attributes of a sale, for 
instance payment by lump sum, the agreement is better viewed as 
non-executory.75  In fact, even though the parties to the agreement 
may intend a non-exclusive license agreement and add labels to the 
contract consistent with such a license, if the function of the 
contract looks more like a sale, with substantial performance 
completed at the outset of the contract, the court will look beyond 
the intent to find the agreement non-executory.76 
Clearly, significant continuing obligations, would also cause a 
non-exclusive license to be classified as executory.77  A more 
 
 73 In re Rudaw/Empirical Software Prods. Ltd., 83 B.R. 241, 246 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1988). 
 74 Id. at 243–46. 
 75 In re Stein, 81 B.R. 263, 266–67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Monument Record 
Corp., 61 B.R. 866, 868–69 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). 
 76 Microsoft Corp. v. Dak Indus., Inc. (In re DAK Indus., Inc.), 66 F.3d 1091, 1095 n.2 
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding a bilateral “License Agreement” granting DAK nonexclusive, 
worldwide license rights to distribute Microsoft’s Word for Windows software program 
on its computer systems to be a lump sum sale of software units based on (1) the pricing 
and timing of the payments which was a lump sum paid at the outset of the agreement 
regardless of how many units it sold; (2) the licensee received all of its rights at the 
beginning of the agreement; (3) the agreement did not simply permit the debtor to use the 
technology, but permitted the debtor to sell the technology; and (4) at the time the 
agreement commenced, Microsoft delivered the master disk from which the copies were 
to be made and therefore had substantially completed its performance at the outset of the 
contract). 
 77 Some examples of common continuing obligations are a continuing obligation to 
account for and pay royalties, duties of notice, responsibilities relating to reporting, 
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difficult question in terms of non-exclusive licenses, however, is 
whether the licensor’s implied contractual promise not to sue the 
licensee for infringement by itself represents an independent 
obligation that can support the classification of the contract as 
executory.  Several cases do classify contracts with such 
obligations as executory.78  However, other courts, examining the 
nature of intellectual property rights, have held otherwise.79  In 
addition, a license with only continuing obligations of 
confidentiality by both parties to the license has been considered 
executory.80  However, a license is not executory simply because it 
obligates one party to make payments of money to the other.81  
Provisions that constitute mere covenants that, if not followed, 
might relieve the other contracting party of continuing 
performance, but would not amount to breach of the contract, also 
do not lead to a definition of executory.82 
The practical result of the above summary is that each software 
license must be analyzed individually, taking into account all the 
obligations owed by each party, to decide whether that particular 
contract will be considered executory by a bankruptcy court.83  The 
rest of this Article, while exploring several specific bankruptcy 
issues that should be anticipated by drafters of software license 
agreements, will examine several prominent cases.  These cases 
also provide illustrations of software license agreements that have 
been found executory and allow a practitioner to make an educated 
 
labeling, policing, service, and maintenance, refraining from licensing to others, and 
obligations to provide product upgrades. See, e.g., Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond 
Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th 
Cir. 1985); Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290, 292 (9th 
Cir. 1980). 
 78 E.g., In re Golden Books Family Entm’t Inc., 269 B.R. 300, 309 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2001); In re Access Beyond Techs. Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 43 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); Everex 
Sys., Inc. v. Cadtrak Corp. (In re CFLC, Inc.), 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 79 See In re Gencor Indus., Inc., 298 B.R. 902, 907 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003). 
 80 RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 264 (4th Cir. 
2004). 
 81 See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1046, citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595. 
 82 In re Gencor Indus., Inc., 298 B.R. 902 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that Most 
Favored Nations Clause and Patent Defense Clause of licensing agreement were mere 
conditions of payment by the licensee, whose failure would excuse further payment, 
rather than material continuing obligations whose failure would breach the contract). 
 83 See, e.g., BRINSON, supra note 15, at 525–26. 
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guess about the status of a pending contract.84  Since the line 
between executory and non-executory is sometimes unclear, a 
prudent drafter should anticipate either conclusion and plan 
accordingly.85 
II. ISSUES FACING A LICENSEE WHEN THE DEBTOR IS A LICENSOR 
Many companies license software from software vendors to 
facilitate their business, either relying on the licensed software for 
internal purposes, such as data processing and accounting, or to 
assist in the creation of their actual product.86  Often, once 
software is licensed and brought into the company, the business 
relies on that software, which becomes an integral part of the 
business process.87  Replacing that software is often extremely 
expensive even if it just requires retraining of the employees that 
use it.88  In addition, the licensee is usually dependent on the 
licensor to correct any bugs or defects in the software, as well as to 
perform any necessary maintenance on the software.89  
Consequently, software license agreements are often accompanied 
by a “maintenance” agreement, which requires the licensor to 
update, debug, and maintain the software for the term of the 
contract.90 
The software licensee, therefore, has a significant interest in 
making sure its license endures for the entire duration of the 
agreement.91  In a controversial 1985 case, Lubrizol Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.,92 however, the Fourth 
 
 84 See, e.g., Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1046. 
 85 See Michelle Morgan Harner et al., Debtors Beware: The Expanding Universe of 
Non-Assumable/Non-Assignable Contracts in Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
187, 189 (2005); 3-27 MILGRIM ON LICENSING § 27.13. 
 86 See Jonathan L. Mezrich, Source Code Escrow: An Exercise in Futility?, 5 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 117, 117–18 (2001). 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Gres, supra note 1, at 363–64. 
 91 See Richard M. Cieri, et. al., Protecting Technology and Intellectual Property Rights 
When a Debtor Infringes on Those Rights, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349, 355 (2000). 
 92 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057 (1986). 
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Circuit found that a technology license agreement was an 
executory contract rejectable by the licensor-debtor under 
§ 365(a).93  In the context of a licensee who depends on the 
licensor for maintenance of software critical to their business, the 
rejection by the licensor can be devastating.94  It requires the 
licensee to either stop using the software altogether and replace it 
with something else, or instead to renegotiate a new license with 
the licensor who can essentially hold-out for an inflated price.95  
Although Lubrizol involved a technology license rather than a 
software license agreement, after it was decided, a number of 
commentators warned that software license agreements would also 
be treated as rejectable executory contracts in the bankruptcy of a 
software licensor.96 
A. Lubrizol Enterprises and Select-A-Seat 
The agreement at issue in Lubrizol was a nonexclusive right to 
use the debtor’s technology.97  Although the license was executed 
and the instruction manuals were delivered to Lubrizol before 
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court held this was an executory 
contract and that attempts at new licensing of the technology, the 
debtor’s principal asset in its Chapter 11 reorganization, were 
hindered by the existing license.98  Under the agreement, the 
debtor’s continuing duties were: 1) to notify Lubrizol about any 
claims of the licensed technology infringing another’s patent; 2) to 
defend the licensee Lubrizol in any patent infringement suit; 3) to 
hold Lubrizol harmless from certain losses; and 4) to notify 
Lubrizol of any licenses granted.99  Lubrizol had continuing 
contractual obligations to: 1) account for and pay the licensor 
royalties for the use of the licensed technology process; and 2) pay 
 
 93 See id. at 1047. 
 94 Cieri, supra note 91, at 355. 
 95 Gres, supra note 1, at 364–65. 
 96 See, e.g., BRINSON, supra note 15, at 520; James E. Meadows, Lubrizol: What Will It 
Mean for the Software Industry, 3 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 311 
(1987); Gres, supra note 1, at 365–66. 
 97 In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 34 B.R. 521, 522 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983). 
 98 Id. at 525. 
 99 Id. at 524. 
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off other existing debts.100  According to the bankruptcy court, 
these obligations, even if contingent, were important aspects of the 
consideration given by the licensor to Lubrizol, and therefore could 
be sufficient to make the contract executory.101 
The district court disagreed with the bankruptcy court, finding 
the technology license agreement non-executory and noting that 
general warranties are not enough of a continuing obligation on 
which to base a finding of an executory contract.102  In addition, 
the court assumed that even if Richmond was allowed to reject the 
license, this rejection would not affect Lubrizol’s ability to use the 
technology or relieve Lubrizol of its obligation to pay royalties.103  
The district court did not think that it had the “power, in a 
summary proceeding, to strip Lubrizol of the intellectual property 
it had purchased from Richmond.”104 
The court of appeals reversed the district court’s decision, 
finding, like the bankruptcy court, that Richmond’s continuing 
duties to licensee Lubrizol and Lubrizol’s duty of accounting for 
and paying royalties were sufficient to make the contract 
executory.105  In addition to relieving the licensor estate of future 
performance obligations under the license, the Lubrizol decision, 
disagreeing with the district court’s assumption, also gave the 
licensor a complete rescission of the technology transfer.106  This 
aspect of the Lubrizol decision was predicted to be especially 
disastrous for software licensees because it revealed the possibility 
that a licensee could lose all rights to licensed software should the 
licensor file bankruptcy.107 
In fact, just five years earlier, in In re Select-A-Seat, the Ninth 
Circuit also held that an exclusive software distribution and use 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 38 B.R. 341, 344 (E.D. Va. 1984). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1045–46 
(4th Cir. 1985). 
 106 Stuart Moskowitz, Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy: New ‘Veto Power’ 
For Licensees Under Section 365(n), 44 BUS. LAW. 771, 780 (1989); see Lubrizol, 756 
F.2d at 1048. 
 107 Moskowitz, supra note 106. 
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license was a rejectable executory contract.108  However, in Select-
A-Seat, the debtor’s trustee sought only to reject the debtor-
licensor’s continuing warranties of title and fitness for purpose and 
the agreement’s exclusive-dealing obligation.109  Unlike the total 
forfeit of use rights by the licensee in Lubrizol, the court allowed 
the former exclusive licensee to continue using and selling the 
licensed software on a nonexclusive basis.110  In comparison, the 
entire rescission aspect of Lubrizol held that the licensee’s right to 
use the licensed technology terminated when the license agreement 
was rejected in the licensor’s bankruptcy, leaving the licensee with 
only a claim for damages for breach of contract.111 
After the Lubrizol decision, the intellectual property 
community’s fear that it was powerless to protect licensees from 
licensor bankruptcy proceedings, resulted in Congressional 
amendments to § 365, commonly known as the Intellectual 
Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1987 (“IPLBA”).112  
Congress’s intent in passing this amendment was to protect 
licensees’ rights to intellectual property in the event of a 
bankruptcy.113 
B. The Congressional Response to Lubrizol and § 365(n) 
The IPLBA was codified in § 365(n), allowing a licensee to 
retain its use right in licensed intellectual property even if the 
licensor rejects the license agreement in bankruptcy.114  Under 
§ 365(n), licensees have two choices when the licensor rejects their 
license while in bankruptcy.  First, the licensee may elect to treat 
 
 108 Fenix Cattle Co. v. Silver (In re Select-A-Seat Corp.), 625 F.2d 290, 292–93 (9th 
Cir. 1980). 
 109 Id. at 292. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d 1048. 
 112 Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Act (IPLBA) of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 
Stat. 2538 (1988) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)); see John P. Musone, Crystallizing the 
Intellectual Property Licenses In Bankruptcy Act: A Proposed Solution To Achieve 
Congress’ Intent, 13 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 509, 509 n.3 (1997). 
 113 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 1–5 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3207 
(explaining that the purpose is “to make clear that the rights of an intellectual property 
licensee to use the licensed property cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the 
rejection of the license . . . .”); see 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2000). 
 114 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 
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the license as terminated and assert a claim for breach of contract 
damages.115  More importantly, the licensee may elect to retain its 
licensed rights in the intellectual property for the duration of the 
contract.116  If the licensee chooses the second option, it must 
continue to make all royalty payments due to the debtor under the 
license agreement.117  The debtor, however, will have “no 
obligation to the licensee after rejection other than to grant the 
licensee unimpeded use of the technology.”118 
C. Lubrizol Problems That Persist after the IPLBA 
Although the IPBLA amended § 365(n) in response to 
Lubrizol, it did not fix all of the problems brought to light by that 
decision.  First, it did not clarify the confusion over what it means 
to reject a contract in bankruptcy.119  Second, it did not give any 
guidance to the courts on how to resolve what is to happen to a 
licensee when a licensor attempts a free and clear sale in 
bankruptcy under § 363.120 
1. What Does It Mean to Reject a Software License in 
Bankruptcy? 
As mentioned in Part I.C above, a trustee can reject an 
executory contract under the Code.121  There appears to be 
confusion in the courts, however, including the Lubrizol court, on 
what is the “effect” of rejecting a contract using § 365.122  A 
rejection is simply an election to breach which does not cause the 
contract to go away or constitute rescission.123  However, some 
courts treat rejection as a species of an avoidance, giving creditors 
 
 115 Id. § 365(n)(1)(A). 
 116 Id. § 365(n)(1)(B). 
 117 Id. § 365(n)(2). 
 118 Cieri, supra note 91, 355–56; see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3). 
 119 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 109. 
 120 Robert M. Zinman, Precision in Statutory Drafting: The Qualitech Quagmire and 
the Sad History of 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV 97, 100 
(2004). 
 121 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000). 
 122 See Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 
(4th Cir. 1985). 
 123 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 112. 
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inside of bankruptcy something they would not have had outside 
bankruptcy.124  In Lubrizol, for example, the district court assumed 
that rejection did not restrict Lubrizol, the licensee, from using the 
technology already in its possession.125  The bankruptcy and 
appeals courts assumed just the opposite; they treated the rejection 
as an avoidance of the entire contract, placing the parties in the 
position they would be in if the contract had never been entered.126  
However, nothing about the nature of rejection requires that the 
trustee be able to undo a property transfer.127  In fact, for real 
property, the code explicitly states that rejection simply follows 
applicable non-bankruptcy law, and does nothing to dispossess the 
licensee of real property.128  The trustee can reject the real property 
lease and free the debtor’s estate from any ongoing obligations, but 
the trustee cannot undo the lease entirely while the lessee is still in 
possession of the property.129 
Section 365(n)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code does limit the 
protection afforded to the licensee’s § 365(n) intellectual property 
rights to those that existed immediately before the licensor’s 
bankruptcy case commenced.130  If the licensee elects to retain its 
rights under § 365(n), they are permitted to enforce only the 
passive obligations of the licensor.131  The licensee cannot require 
specific performance of other obligations included in the license, 
such as service provisions by the licensor.132  Of course, the 
licensee would have claims against the bankruptcy estate for any of 
these service provisions, such as obligations of the licensor to 
provide maintenance and upgrades.133  However, unlike § 365(h), 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 756 F.2d at 1048. 
 126 See id. 
 127 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 114. 
 128 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A) (2000); see also BAIRD, supra note 17, at 114. 
 129 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h); see also BAIRD, supra note 17, at 114. 
 130 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id.  See also Madlyn Gleich Primoff et. al., E-Commerce and Dot-Com 
Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including 
Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related Issues Under Section 365(c), 365(e) and 
365(n) of the Bankruptcy code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 307, 342 (2000). 
 133 BAIRD, supra note 17, at 116. 
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§ 365(n) does not explicitly state what rejection means for any 
technology already being used by the licensee.134 
Commentators disagree about whether the rule for rejection of 
all technology licenses should mirror that of a traditional real 
property lease.135  However, the specific rules governing 
technology licenses in § 365(n) are similar to those governing real 
property in § 365(h), leading to the conclusion that the results of 
rejection should be the same.136  There is no bankruptcy reason to 
override applicable non-bankruptcy law and allow the trustee the 
power to recapture rights they could not outside bankruptcy.137  
The correct view should be that “rejection of executory aspects of 
a contract does not bring about a rescission of property transfers 
completed prior to bankruptcy.”138 
2. What Is the Effect of a Debtor-Licensor § 363 Free and  
Clear Sale? 
Another question left open by the addition of § 365(n) is how 
to reconcile this provision with § 363(f).139  Section 363(f) 
authorizes a “free and clear sale,” allowing the sale of a debtor’s 
property free of any “interest” other than the estate’s.140  If a free 
and clear sale of the underlying technology is held to trump the 
§ 365(n) protection given to technology licensees, then such a sale 
will extinguish the licensee’s rights to use the licensed technology, 
 
 134 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2000). 
 135 Compare BAIRD, supra note 17, at 118, with BRINSON, supra note 15, at 529. 
 136 See, e.g., BAIRD, supra note 17, at 120–21. 
 137 Id. at 120. 
 138 BRINSON, supra note 15, at 529. 
 139 11 U.S.C. § 363(f): 
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and 
clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if— 
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear 
of such interest; 
(2) such entity consents; 
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is 
greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property; 
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or 
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept 
a money satisfaction of such interest. 
 140 11 U.S.C. § 363(f); Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel (In re Qualitech Steel 
Corp.), 327 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 2003). 
BISK_FORMATTED_STAFFPROOF_032307 3/24/2007  3:48:32 PM 
632 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. XVII 
just as in the Lubrizol case.141  While there are relatively few cases 
deciding this issue, in 2003 the Seventh Circuit decided that for the 
analogous executory contract protection for property leases, 
§ 365(h), a free and clear sale of the underlying real property does 
in fact trump the § 365(h) statutory protection to leases.142 
As in Lubrizol, the district court in Qualitech disagreed with 
both the bankruptcy and the appeals courts.143  The district court 
concluded that § 365(h) trumped the free and clear sale because of 
the specific terms of § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) expressly stating that a 
non-debtor lessee may elect to retain possession of the property 
after a rejection of an unexpired lease thus allowing the lessee to 
remain in possession of the property even in the face of the § 363 
sale.144  The district court also looked to the legislative history of 
§ 365(h) and found that the intent of Congress was to preserve the 
lessee’s estate.145 Finally, the district court noted that § 365(h) does 
not reference any other provision of the Bankruptcy Code as a 
limitation.146 
The Seventh Circuit overruled the district court, using statutory 
construction to decide that a free and clear sale does trump 
§ 365(h)’s protection of the lessee’s possessory interest in the sold 
property.147  The court interpreted the term “any interest” as used 
in § 363(f) as being sufficiently broad to include the lessee’s 
interest as a lessee.148 Since, § 363(f) standing alone permits the 
sale of the property free and clear of a lessee’s possessory interest, 
the court concluded that § 365(h) can only protect the lessee if it 
supersedes the free and clear sale.149  However, because neither 
section contains any limiting cross-section, and § 365(h)(1)(A) is 
limited to when an unexpired lease is rejected, but does not 
mention sale, the court held that § 365(h) does not supersede the 
 
 141 See In re Qualitech Steel Corp., 327 F.3d at 540. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel (In re Qualitech Steel Corp.), 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8328 (S.D. Ind. 2001). 
 144 Id. at *14. 
 145 Id. at *37. 
 146 Id. at *46. 
 147 In re Qualitech Steel Corp., 327 F.3d at 540. 
 148 Id. at 545. 
 149 Id. at 546–47. 
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free and clear sale.150  In addition, the court noted that § 363 itself 
provides for the requirement of adequate protection to any entity 
with an interest in the property to be sold, here the lessee.151  
Holding that this adequate protection can be provided in the form 
of compensation as opposed to a continued possessory interest in 
the property, the court held that this right to compensation was 
adequate protection for the lessee.152 
This Seventh Circuit decision has caused great concern in the 
real estate investment community because it allows a landlord in 
bankruptcy to ignore the protections given by § 365(h) potentially 
resulting in a disruption in leasehold investments.153  Since 
Qualitech does apply normal rules of statutory interpretation, and 
may therefore be followed by other courts, it has resulted in an 
urge to Congress to address these complications in the statute.154  
One caveat to Qualitech that may prove helpful to future lessees is 
that the lessee in the case did not object, as was their right under 
§ 363, to the free and clear sale.155  There is no way to predict what 
would have happened if the lessee had filed an objection at the 
time the sale was proposed.156 
Although Qualitech concerned a real property lease and 
§ 365(h) as opposed to a technology license and § 365(n), since the 
Qualitech court’s analysis would be equally applicable to the 
§ 365(n) protection of technology licensees, those rights and 
interests may also be at risk in a free and clear sale.157 
 
 150 Id. at 547. 
 151 Id. at 548. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Zinman, supra note 120, at 100. 
 154 Id. at 100–01. 
 155 In re Qualitech Steel Corp., 327 F.3d at 541. 
 156 Peter N. Tamposi, Tenants Beware—Your Lease Rights May Be Subject to 
Termination by the Bankruptcy Court: Licensees of Intellectual Property Take Note: You 
May Be Next, 22-8 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30 (2003). 
 157 Id. at 30. 
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III. ISSUES FACING A LICENSEE WHEN THEY ARE  
ALSO THE DEBTOR 
The Lubrizol case, as demonstrated above, highlighted the 
problem of rejection by a debtor-licensor depriving a licensee of 
rights negotiated pre-bankruptcy.  A similar loss of contractual 
rights can arise when the licensee in a software license agreement 
files for bankruptcy and the licensor refuses to consent to an 
assignment of the license by the reorganized debtor in possession. 
A. Section 365 and the Hypothetical versus the Actual Test 
As discussed in Section IB and C above, § 365 gives a trustee, 
or debtor in possession, the authority to assume, assign or reject 
the executory contracts of the debtor, notwithstanding any contrary 
provisions appearing in such contracts.158  Section 365(c), 
however, contains an exception to this general rule, prohibiting a 
debtor from assuming or assigning an executory contract if 
“applicable law” excuses the non-debtor party from accepting 
performance from anyone other than the original contract party.159  
These rules develop from a straightforward reading of § 365(c). 
Confusion arises, however, when § 365(c)(1) is read together 
with § 365(f).160  Section 365(f) permits a debtor to assume and 
assign an executory contract to a third party.161  Before assignment 
to a third party, the debtor must first assume the contract and 
provide the non-debtor party adequate assurance of future 
performance by the proposed assignee.162  Since § 365(f) contains 
 
 158 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000); Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t. 
Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 159 11 U.S.C. § 365(c); Harner, supra note 85, at 197. 
 160 Harner, supra note 85, at 197. 
 161 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (“Except as provided in subsection[] . . . (c) of this section, 
notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or 
in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or 
lease, the trustee may assign such contract or lease . . . .”). 
 162 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(A) (“The trustee may assign an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor only if . . . the trustee assumes such contract or lease in 
accordance with the provisions of this section . . . .”); § 365(f)(2)(B) (“The trustee may 
assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor only if . . . adequate 
assurance of future performance by the assignee of such contract or lease is provided, 
whether or not there has been a default in such contract or lease.”). 
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the provision “notwithstanding a provision in [the] executory 
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that 
prohibits, restricts, or conditions the assignment of such contract or 
lease,” the two sections seem to conflict if “applicable” law 
excuses a non-debtor party from accepting the performance of a 
third party assignee.163  In this situation, § 365(c)(1) would prevent 
both assumption and assignment of the contract, while § 365(f) 
would permit such assumption and assignment.164  Even more 
problematic is what a court should do in the case that applicable 
law prohibits assignment, but the debtor is seeking only to assume 
and not assign the executory contract.165 
While some courts attempt to resolve this apparent conflict by 
interpreting the term “applicable law” differently in § 365(c)(1) 
and § 365(f),166 most courts give effect to § 365(c)(1) when the 
executory contract is for personal services.167  If a debtor in 
possession seeks to assume a license for the benefit of a 
reorganized debtor, but that license is considered a personal 
services contract preventing such assumption, the licensor is put in 
a position of extraordinary power over the debtor-licensee, 
especially if the technology licensed by the executory contract is 
critical for the survival of the reorganized debtor.168  The licensor 
will be able to hold-out for significant price increases and, similar 
to the licensor-debtor in a Lubrizol-type situation, can extract 
exorbitant fees to allow the licensee merely to retain its bargained-
for benefit.169 
So, the answer to the question of whether § 365(c)(1) or 
§ 365(f) reigns when the debtor-licensee attempts to assume a 
license has vital importance to the survival of the reorganized 
 
 163 Harner, supra note 85, at 197. 
 164 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A) (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 365(f). 
 165 See id. 
 166 See, e.g., RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 
266 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 167 See, e.g., Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t. Inc.), 165 F.3d 
747, 752 (9th Cir. 1999); In re James Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534, 538 (11th Cir. 
1994); In re Magness, 972 F.2d 689, 695 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 168 See Harner, supra note 85, at 233–35. 
 169 See generally id. (describing the consequences of § 365(c)(1), where a debtor wishes 
to assume an executory contract and applicable nonbankruptcy law restricts assignment). 
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debtor.170  Currently, the courts are split between two tests for 
determining the answer to this question.171  The first test, the 
hypothetical test, prohibits a debtor from assuming an executory 
contract over the non-debtor’s objection “if applicable law would 
bar assignment to a hypothetical third party, even where the debtor 
in possession has no intention of assigning the contract in question 
to any such third party.”172  The second test, the actual test, only 
prohibits the assignment of an executory contract if the debtor 
actually seeks to assign the contract.173  The actual test thus allows 
the debtor-licensee to retain its contractual benefit as long as it 
does not also attempt to assign that benefit to a third party and will 
be the test preferred by licensees. 
B. Catapult Entertainment and Sunterra Corporation 
Unfortunately, many courts have opted for the hypothetical test 
when dealing with technology licenses.174  For example, in 
Catapult, a patent licensor attempted to bar a debtor/licensee from 
assuming patent licenses as part of its Chapter 11 reorganization.175  
While the bankruptcy and district courts approved the assumption 
as part of the confirmed reorganization plan, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed, using the hypothetical test to hold that § 365(c)(1) barred 
the licensee from assuming the licenses.176  The Catapult court 
stated that “where applicable non-bankruptcy law makes an 
executory contract non-assignable because the identity of the non-
debtor party is material, a debtor in possession may not assume the 
contract absent consent of the nondebtor party.”177 
In addition, the Fourth Circuit adopted the equivalent of the 
hypothetical test for software licenses in In re Sunterra 
 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Perlman v. Catapult Entm’t, Inc. (In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc.), 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
 173 Harner, supra note 159, at 235. 
 174 See, e.g., In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d at 748; RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra 
Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 175 In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d at 749. 
 176 Id. at 749–51. 
 177 Id. at 754–55. 
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Corporation.178  In Sunterra, the licensee was a resort management 
that entered into a non-exclusive license to use software from RCI, 
the licensor, for functions such as recording reservations, 
managing resort properties, and marketing and financing 
timeshares.179  In addition to basing its internal operations on the 
licensed software, Sunterra, the licensee, invested large amounts of 
capital into the licensed system by developing its own software 
enhancements, which Sunterra then owned under the license 
agreement.180  “[T]he bankruptcy court confirmed Sunterra’s plan 
of reorganization” finding that the RCI license agreement was not 
an executory contract, and even if it were, the actual test allowed 
the assumption of the agreement since Sunterra did not intend to 
assign it to a third party.181  The bankruptcy court reasoned that 
RCI would not be damaged if Sunterra, as debtor in possession, 
“assumed the very contract rights it had possessed prior to 
bankruptcy.”182 
The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s ultimate 
assumption decision, but disagreed with the finding that the license 
was non-executory.183  The district court assumed the license was 
executory because “there is a long line of authority holding that 
intellectual property licensing agreements . . . are executory 
contracts.”184  Although it was an executory contract, the district 
court did agree that Sunterra could assume the license by applying 
the actual test.185 
The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, found the license to be an 
executory contract using the “Countryman Test” of executory 
contract, because at the time of the bankruptcy each party owed the 
 
 178 In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d at 262. 
 179 Id. at 260. 
 180 Id. at 261. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 261–62. 
 183 Id. at 262. 
 184 RCC Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp., 287 B.R. 864, 865 (D. Md. 2003) (citing In re 
CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 
237 B.R. 32, 43–44 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999). 
 185 In re Sunterra, 261 F.3d at 263; RCC Tech. Corp., 278 B.R. at 866. 
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other an ongoing obligation of confidentiality.186  In addition, the 
court adopted the hypothetical test and held that Sunterra was 
precluded from assuming the license because “no matter how 
appealing” the actual test would be from a policy standpoint, the 
plain language required the use of the hypothetical test.187 
Sunterra, who standardized its internal operations on licensed 
software, invested large amounts of capital in customizing that 
software, and even owned the enhancements it created, was 
deprived of any use of that software in its reorganization unless 
given explicit consent by the licensor.188  This outcome is just 
another example of how the current bankruptcy code insufficiently 
protects licenses.189  The consequences for licensees who lose all 
their contractual rights in bankruptcy are exceedingly harsh.190  
The hypothetical test makes the license of the debtor-licensee 
completely void.191  In addition, in cases where the licensed 
software is embedded within hardware, the application of 
§ 365(c)(1) can lead to the prohibition of the simple selling off of a 
debtor’s assets.192  For instance, if a trustee wants to sell off a 
router with a ROM embedded with licensed software, the trustee 
would be precluded from selling unless the licensor agreed to the 
sale.  The licensor thus can use withholding his consent to 
effectively extort the licensee.193 
 
 186 Id. at 264.  The Countryman Test provides that a contract is executory if the 
“obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far 
unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a 
material breach excusing the performance of the other.” Countryman, supra note 31, 
at 460. 
 187 Id. at 269. 
 188 Id. at 260. 
 189 Sommer Nicole Louie, The Inadequacy of Bankruptcy Protection for the 
Biotechnology Industry, 22 BANK. DEV. J. 337, 362 (2005). 
 190 Id. at 365. 
 191 Id. at 361. 
 192 Cf. In re Pathnet, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1262 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002). 
 193 Cf. Zinman, supra note 120, at 159–60 (explaining the potential stranglehold a tenant 
has over a debtor by being able to sell the property regardless of any anti-assignment 
provisions). 
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IV. ISSUES FACING A LICENSOR WHEN THE DEBTOR IS A LICENSEE 
Licensors also should plan for the possible bankruptcy of the 
licensee when drafting the license agreement.  In general, the 
advantages given to a licensee in bankruptcy, described above, will 
work as a constraint on the licensor.  A licensor may prefer to 
terminate any license with any licensee who files for bankruptcy, 
but it is not as easy as simply providing for termination of the 
contract upon either party’s filing of a bankruptcy petition in the 
license agreement.  Under the Bankruptcy Code, these clauses are 
called “ipso facto” or bankruptcy clauses, and have no effect.194  A 
debtor’s property interest becomes property of the estate 
notwithstanding a provision in the license agreement that “is 
conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor, 
[or] on the commencement of a case under this title . . . , and that 
effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or 
termination of the debtor’s interest in property” upon the 
commencement of bankruptcy.195  Also, as opposed to the 
protection given to technology licensees, the IPLBA does not 
extend any special protection to licensors whose licensees file for 
bankruptcy.196 
A. Rejection, Assumption, and Assignment by the Licensee 
When the licensee is in bankruptcy, as mentioned above, as a 
debtor, the licensee will have three options with regard to the 
license agreement—rejection, assumption, and assumption and 
assignment.197  If the licensee chooses to reject the license, the 
licensor will lose any anticipated revenues and any expected 
performance still due by the licensee.198  The licensor will have a 
claim on the debtor’s estate for the breach of the agreement; 
however, this will usually bring in only a small percentage of the 
actual damages.199 
 
 194 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (2000); see also BRINSON, supra note 15, at 527. 
 195 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1). 
 196 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 
 197 See 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
 198 BRINSON, supra note 15, at 528. 
 199 Id. 
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If the licensee decides to assume the executory license, the 
licensor may have other problems.  First, although the assumption 
is a new promise to perform, the entity now making this promise is 
under the constraints of the bankruptcy process and the licensor 
may see this as an increased business risk.200  If the licensee has 
not actually breached the contract at the time of its bankruptcy 
filing, there is no requirement of any adequate assurance of future 
performance.201  In addition, even if there is a breach, which would 
allow the licensor to terminate the agreement outside of 
bankruptcy, the licensee can instead choose to cure the breach and 
give adequate assurance of future performance.202  The court gets 
to decide what is acceptable adequate assurance, even if the 
licensor does not agree.203 
In addition, as described above, a licensor will have a hard time 
predicting when a court will find a software license assumable.204  
First, there is the question of whether the hypothetical or actual test 
will be used to decide if assumption only will be allowed.205  
Second, since a software license is not a pure patent or copyright 
license, there is some risk that a court will find that software 
licenses are not personal contracts and that, therefore, applicable 
law does not prevent their assignment to a third party.206  In fact, 
even Vern Countryman, the author of the current executory 
contract definition, finds the notion that even pure patent licenses 
are all personal services contracts and thus blocked from 
assignability as “too mechanical” an analysis.207  If a court finds 
the software license validly assignable under applicable law, the 
licensor could find itself in a position of licensing its technology to 
a third party it objects to, including possibly a competitor.208 
 
 200 Id. at 530. 
 201 Id. at 531. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 See supra Part III. 
 205 See supra notes 169–87 and accompanying text in Part III.B. 
 206 BRINSON, supra note 15, at 531–32. 
 207 Id. at 534; Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58 MINN. 
L. REV. 479, 503 (1974). 
 208 See BRINSON, supra note 15, at 534. 
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B. The Assignability of Software License Agreements 
For example, in In re Sentry Data,209 a bankruptcy court found 
that a software license and distribution agreement was assignable 
because applicable law allowed the assignment in the absence of a 
specific contract provision prohibiting such assignment.210  In this 
case, Sentry, a software vendor, was the licensor and did not want 
to allow an assignment by the licensee.211  Since the court found 
that the contract made no express or implied reference to personal 
services, to marketing best efforts, or to any prohibition on 
assignment, the contract was assignable.212  Important to this 
determination was the fact that the contract included a provision 
permitting sublicensing suggesting that Sentry did not intend to 
restrict the license to a particular entity.213  The court did not even 
mention the presumption of intellectual property licenses as 
unassignable personal services contracts.214 
In Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp.,215 the parties 
had cross-license agreements for non-exclusive perpetual 
licenses.216  Each cross-license included a broad prohibition on 
assignment or sublicensing, but allowed the benefits of the cross-
licenses to be extended to affiliated companies.217  When 
Cambridge Biotech (“CBC”) filed for bankruptcy, it proposed to 
assume the cross-licenses and then sell all its stock and assign the 
cross-licenses to a subsidiary of a direct competitor to Institut 
Pasteur (“Pasteur”).218  Not surprisingly, Pasteur objected to 
licensing its technology to a direct competitor.219  The First Circuit 
upheld the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow the assumption of 
the cross-licenses and the determination that the proposed sale was 
 
 209 87 B.R. 943 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). 
 210 Id. at 948. 
 211 Id. at 945. 
 212 Id. at 948. 
 213 Id.; Elaine D. Ziff, The Effect of Corporate Acquisitions on the Target Company’s 
License Rights, 57 BUS. LAW. 767 (2002). 
 214 Id. 
 215 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 216 Id. at 490. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
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not actually an assignment, but merely an assumption by the 
reorganized debtor under new ownership.220  Although a patent 
license, the court found that the relationship between the two 
parties was not a personal services contract.221  However, since the 
First Circuit adopts the actual test, if the use by the new owners is 
not an assignment, the licensee will be allowed to assume a 
contract it does not intend to assign even if the applicable law 
would not ordinarily permit the assignment.222  Therefore, the First 
Circuit did not need to decide whether the license was a personal 
services contract or not.  The result of the decision, though, 
effectively required Pasteur to license its patented technology to a 
competitor. 
Some courts, however, take into consideration the commercial 
interests of the licensor when deciding whether to allow an 
assignment by a debtor-licensee.223  The bankruptcy court in In re 
Access Beyond Techs., Inc.224 allowed a patent licensor to prohibit 
assignment by the debtor-licensee to a direct competitor that would 
eliminate any competitive advantage by the licensor in the 
market.225  First, the court determined that the license was 
executory because each party had a continuing obligation to refrain 
from suing the other for infringement and each party was required 
to grant the other party sub-licenses.226  Noting that the patent laws 
are designed to prevent a direct competitor from using a patented 
invention without permission of the patent owner, the court found 
that the patent license was a personal services contract and not 
assignable notwithstanding the provision allowing sublicensing.227 
Although there are few cases deciding the issue of whether 
software licenses are personal services contracts and thus 
unassignable by a debtor-licensee, two such cases find that 
 
 220 Id. at 491. 
 221 Id. 
 222 See id. at 494. 
 223 See Ziff, supra note 213, at 767. 
 224 237 B.R. 32 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999). 
 225 Id. at 45. 
 226 Id. at 43–44. 
 227 Id. at 45. 
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software licenses are unassignable under applicable law.228  The 
court in Buildnet found that under the Copyright Act, nonexclusive 
software licenses are personal to the licensees and therefore not 
assignable without the consent of the licensor.229  In addition, since 
the software at issue was “highly sophisticated and customized for 
the individual needs of a customer,” the needs of the customer 
were reflected in the purchase price making the identity of the 
licensee material.230  Since the license also contained a 
confidentiality provision, the possibility of purchase by a 
competitor would “strip the copyright holder of the right to control 
the dissemination of their copyrighted material and would 
undermine the purpose of the Copyright Act.”231 
V. DRAFTING A SOFTWARE LICENSE TO PROTECT YOUR CLIENT  
IN THE EVENT OF A BANKRUPTCY 
This part provides some ideas of possible fixes to the problems 
listed in the rest of this Article.  While by no means an exhaustive 
list of tips for negotiating or drafting a software licensing 
agreement, it does provide some idea of how a party can protect its 
rights in anticipation of a future bankruptcy filing by one of the 
parties to the agreement. 
A. Congressional Fixes 
Much of the confusion inherent in software licenses in 
bankruptcy arises due to the ambiguity in the Bankruptcy Code 
when reading § 365(c)(1) and § 365(f) together.232  One way to 
make the results of a bankruptcy petition on a software license 
more predictable would be to actually fix the statute.233  Either 
section could be amended to make the two provisions consistent.  
One proposed change would amend § 365(c)(1) to read “the 
 
 228 RCI Tech. Corp. v. Sunterra Corp. (In re Sunterra Corp.), 361 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 
2004); In re BulidNet, Inc., 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1851 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2002). 
 229 In re BuildNet, Inc., 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1851, at *13. 
 230 Id. at *16. 
 231 Id. 
 232 See supra Part III. 
 233 See Louie, supra note 189, at 362. 
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[debtor] may not assume and assign any executory contract.”234  
This would make it clear that the actual test is preferred and would 
allow a debtor to assume a license even if applicable law 
prohibited an assignment.235 
In addition to resolving the split between the actual and 
hypothetical tests, a comprehensive congressional fix should 
resolve the question of whether nonexclusive intellectual property 
licenses are personal services contracts.236  Although most courts 
do find nonexclusive patent and copyright licenses to be personal 
services contracts, the lack of statutory guidance makes this 
outcome somewhat unpredictable.  Finally, a statutory definition of 
executory contracts with specific language regarding what 
obligations are sufficient to constitute a finding of an executory 
contract would clear up considerable unpredictability and 
ambiguity that plagues software licenses when one party files for 
bankruptcy.237 
B. Carefully Structure Licensing Agreements Prior to Bankruptcy 
Since any type of statutory amendment would require much 
time and lobbying in order to become reality, it is not a practical 
solution for parties currently engaged in licensing software.  For 
those parties unable to wait for a statutory or judicially created fix 
to the problems mentioned in this article, one solution is to 
carefully structure the software license in an attempt to gain at 
least some control over the outcome in the event one party to the 
agreement files for bankruptcy.238 
As mentioned above, simply including a clause triggering 
termination of the license upon a bankruptcy filing will not work 
because such provisions have no effect in bankruptcy.239  Instead, 
the parties can structure the transaction as something other than a 
license.240  Since a contract can escape executory treatment in 
 
 234 Id. at 367 (emphasis added). 
 235 Id. 
 236 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 237 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 238 Louie, supra note 189, at 362. 
 239 See discussion supra Part IV. 
 240 Louie, supra note 189, at 362. 
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bankruptcy if one or both parties have fully performed, one way to 
contract around the problems listed in this Article is to create a 
fully paid, nonexecutory license for the software and put any 
continuing obligations, like maintenance and upgrade services in a 
separate executory contract.241  In the event of a bankruptcy filing, 
only the executory agreement would be subject to § 365.242  This 
option will be more attractive to the licensee since a completed 
transfer will result in copyright rights being swept into the 
bankruptcy estate, available to the licensee’s trustee for use, sale or 
lease.243  It is unclear whether § 363 provides any protection for 
the licensor should this situation occur.244 
A contract can also escape executory treatment if it is 
terminated by one party in reaction to the other party’s material 
breach prior to the bankruptcy filing.245  This option is more 
attractive to the licensor than the previously mentioned “completed 
transfer” option.246  In order to allow for this prebankruptcy 
termination, a software license should include a provision allowing 
for termination at will by either party or termination based on a 
specified failure.247  Examples of such failures are nonpayment of 
fees or failure of one party to meet objective performance 
criteria.248  Termination clauses that include a cure right or grace 
period are risky because if the other party files for bankruptcy 
during a contractual grace period, the right to cure will pass to the 
trustee.249  A licensor will benefit from an automatic reversion 
clause, which will provide for reversion of all formally licensed or 
assigned rights upon termination.250  This will ensure that a 
licensee does not retain any use rights no matter which view of 
rejection the court embraces when dealing with nonexclusive 
licenses.251  Finally, the party who terminates a license agreement 
 
 241 Id. at 363. 
 242 See id. at 362. 
 243 BRINSON, supra note 15, at 544–45. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 543. 
 246 See id. at 543–44. 
 247 See id. at 543. 
 248 Id. at 542. 
 249 Id. at 544–45. 
 250 Id. at 545–46. 
 251 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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should obtain written acknowledgment, if possible, from the other 
party to eliminate any doubt as to the status of the contract in the 
event of a bankruptcy filing. 
C. Carefully Designate Payments 
Under § 365(n), the licensee, to retain its rights to a rejected 
license, must continue to pay royalties.252  Therefore, it is 
important when negotiating the license to clearly define the royalty 
payments.  Moreover, if other payments are due, it is important to 
specify what those payments are in consideration for, such as a 
maintenance or upgrade fee; “that way there is less of a risk that a 
bankruptcy court will subsequently recharacterize such payments 
as [continuing] royalties.”253  In order “to provide additional 
incentive to the licensor to assume the license in a subsequent 
bankruptcy, the licensee could try to structure the royalty payments 
and other license payments to be distributed evenly over the term 
of the license rather than a ‘front-end-loaded’ license.”254 
D. Source Code Escrow 
Software licenses often have included provisions or an entire 
supplementary agreement providing for source code escrow.255  
The licensor will be required to deposit the source code into a third 
party escrow if certain trigger events occur.256  As mentioned 
several times in this article, while it is common for the trigger 
event to be insolvency or a bankruptcy filing, these provisions will 
not be honored in bankruptcy.257  Even if the trigger is valid within 
bankruptcy, it is probable that the reorganized debtor or trustee 
will not have the knowledge or resources to assist in the transfer of 
 
 252 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B) (2000). 
 253 Philip S. Warden, Protecting Your Rights to Intellectual Property in Bankruptcy, 
PILLSBURY, WINTHROP, SHAW, PITTMAN, Dec. 1, 1999, available at http://library. 
findlaw.com/1999/Sep/1/129756.html (citing Warden and Costello, New Bankruptcy 
Code § 365(n): Limited Comfort for the Technology Licensee, 10 CEB CAL. BUS. L. REP. 
158 (1989)). 
 254 Id. 
 255 Denson, supra note 49, at 2. 
 256 Id. 
 257 See discussion supra Part I. 
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the software to the non-debtor.258  Therefore, in order for software 
turned over to the licensee to be useful, it needs to be the most 
recent version and sufficiently detailed for the licensee to use and 
understand without the help of the licensor.259 
In order to make a software escrow agreement worthwhile, the 
trigger for a source code turnover should be based on something 
other than the financial situation or bankruptcy filing of the 
licensor.260  For instance, the license can include a clause that gives 
the licensee the right to decide when an event triggering release 
has occurred, if possible, without the required approval from the 
licensor.261  Any trigger should be clearly spelled out to avoid 
disagreement over whether a release has actually occurred.262 
In addition, the agreement should specify as explicitly as 
possible the version of the software to be turned over.263  The 
licensor should have an affirmative duty under the agreement to 
update and document any source code in escrow.264  This can be 
guaranteed by providing in the agreement for the use of a 
reputable, proven escrow agent with an adequate verification 
process in place.265  This verification process gives assurances to 
the licensee that the source code is being well-maintained and will 
be usable, without licensor support, upon release.266  Finally, the 
license should provide that the licensee can hire the licensor’s 
employees who are knowledgeable about the software if the 
licensor is no longer willing or able to provide assistance under the 
license.267 
 
 258 See Denson, supra note 49, at 3–4. 
 259 Warden, supra note 253. 
 260 See discussion supra Part V.C. 
 261 Denson, supra note 53, at 15–16. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Warden, supra note 253. 
 264 Id. 
 265 Denson, supra note 53, at 16. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Warden, supra note 253. 
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E. Object Early and Often in Debtor’s Attempt to Sell Property 
Free and Clear 
In order to prevent a Qualitech-type loss of licensee interest in 
a technology license, a licensee of any licensor that files for 
bankruptcy should object early and often to any motion for a free 
and clear sale of the debtor’s actions and/or insist on adequate 
protection from any such sale.268  In addition, any software 
licensee should be alert for any notice following a bankruptcy 
filing by the licensor of any of its critical software.269 
F. Special Purpose Vehicles 
A more complicated, but potentially quite powerful, technique 
for avoiding bankruptcy-related problems is to create a bankruptcy 
remote entity and transfer title to the software to this entity.270  A 
bankruptcy remote entity is an entity that is ineligible for 
bankruptcy and serves a special purpose, such as holding 
intellectual property, with less bankruptcy risk.271  In order to carry 
out this technique, the license can establish a trust which is not 
eligible for bankruptcy.272  The trust then should create beneficial 
interests and licenses in favor of both parties.273  The parties can, 
instead, create a LLC in which they are both members.274  Finally, 
the licensor can contribute the software to a special holding 
subsidiary, which does not have any debt or creditors and therefore 
can predictably remain solvent.275  In order to protect the licensee’s 
interests completely, the parties should follow steps to make sure 
 
 268 See Zinman, supra note 120, at 160–61. 
 269 See id. at 120.  Professor Alec Ostrow believes one of the problems leading to the 
Qualitech decision was that Qualitech was given inadequate notice of the sale and did not 
realize that its rights as a lessee were in jeopardy. Id. at 120 n.75. 
 270 Louie, supra note 189, at 364. 
 271 Id. 
 272 G. Larry Engel & Menachem O. Zelmanovitz, Failing Biotechnology Companies: 
Fire Sales and Bankruptcy: Risks and Opportunities in Acquiring Biotechnology 
Enterprises, 760 PLI/Pat, 879–80 (2003). 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
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that the special purpose entity remains separate from the 
licensor.276 
G. Create a Security Interest 
Finally, either party can take a security interest in the 
license.277  The foreclosure on the security interest can occur prior 
to bankruptcy if valid triggers are included in the contract.278  If the 
foreclosure is completed before the other party enters bankruptcy, 
the court will not reverse the foreclosure.279  In addition, 
bankruptcy law respects the rights of secured creditors giving them 
protections unavailable to unsecured creditors.280  Section 363 
requires a trustee to “prohibit [the] . . . use, sale, or lease as is 
necessary to provide adequate protection” of property on request of 
the secured party.281 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Software licenses are generally liable to sometimes surprising 
treatment when one party files for bankruptcy.282  This treatment 
can be devastating to a business that relies on the software 
involved, either as a primary asset or as a tool on which their 
business is run.283  Since the amendment of the bankruptcy code is 
unlikely in the short-term, parties to a software license should 
anticipate the bankruptcy possibilities and draft their licenses 
accordingly.284 
Software licenses will likely be treated as executory contracts 
in bankruptcy.285  Since the options given to the debtor when a 
contract is found to be executory, rejection, assumption, and 
assignment, may be undesirable from the perspective of the non-
 
 276 See id. 
 277 See Louie, supra note 189, at 351; Brinson, supra note 15, at 541–42. 
 278 Brinson, supra note 15, at 541–42. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Brinson, supra note 15, at 541–42.  See also 11 U.S.C. § 725. 
 281 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(e) (2006). 
 282 See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 283 See discussion supra Introduction. 
 284 See discussion supra Part V.B. 
 285 See discussion supra Part I.D-E. 
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bankruptcy party, parties drafting software licenses may wish to 
attempt to draft their agreements in a way to avoid executory 
treatment.286  In addition, parties can use various other techniques 
to ensure that their rights are protected in the event of the 
bankruptcy filing by the other party to the agreement.287 
 
 286 See discussion supra Part V.B-C. 
 287 See discussion supra Part V.D–F. 
